Differences in Outpatient Dermatology Encounter Work Relative Value Units and Net Payments by Patient Race, Sex, and Age.

Importance: Clinical productivity measures may be factors in financial incentives for providing care to specific patient populations and thus may perpetuate inequitable health care. Objective: To identify the association of patient race, age, and sex with work relative value units (wRVUs) generated by outpatient dermatology encounters. Design, Setting, and Participants: This cross-sectional study obtained demographic and billing data for outpatient dermatology encounters (ie, an encounter performed within a department of dermatology) from September 1, 2016, to March 31, 2020, at the Emory Clinic, an academic dermatologic practice in Atlanta, Georgia. Participants included adults aged 18 years or older with available age, race, and sex data in the electronic health record system. Main Outcomes and Measures: The primary outcome was wRVUs generated per encounter. Results: A total of 66 463 encounters among 30 036 unique patients were included. Patients had a mean (SD) age of 55.9 (18.5) years and were predominantly White (46 575 [70.1%]) and female (39 598 [59.6%]) individuals. In the general dermatologic practice, the mean (SD) wRVUs per encounter was 1.40 (0.71). In adjusted analysis, Black, Asian, and other races (eg, American Indian or Native American, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, and multiple races); female sex; and younger age were associated with fewer wRVUs per outpatient dermatology encounter. Compared with general dermatologic visits with White patients, visits with Black patients generated 0.27 (95% CI, 0.25-0.28) fewer wRVUs per encounter, visits with Asian patients generated 0.22 (95% CI, 0.20-0.25) fewer wRVUs per encounter, and visits with patients of other race generated 0.19 (95% CI, 0.14-0.24) fewer wRVUs per encounter. Female sex was also associated with 0.11 (95% CI, 0.10-0.12) fewer wRVUs per encounter, and wRVUs per encounter increased by 0.006 (95% CI, 0.006-0.006) with each 1-year increase in age. In the general dermatologic practice excluding Mohs surgeons, destruction of premalignant lesions and biopsies were mediators for the observed differences in race (56.2% [95% CI, 53.1%-59.3%] for Black race, 53.2% [95% CI, 45.6%-63.8%] for Asian race, and 53.6% [95% CI, 40.4%-77.4%] for other races), age (65.6%; 95% CI, 60.5%-71.4%), and sex (82.3%; 95% CI, 72.7%-93.1%). In a data set including encounters with Mohs surgeons, the race, age, and sex differences in wRVUs per encounter were greater than in the general dermatologic data set. Mohs surgery for basal cell and squamous cell carcinomas was a mediator for the observed differences in race (46.0% [95% CI, 42.6%-49.4%] for Black race, 41.9% [95% CI, 35.5%-49.2%] for Asian race, and 34.6% [95% CI, 13.8%-51.5%] for other races), age (49.2%; 95% CI, 44.9%-53.7%), and sex (47.9%; 95% CI, 42.0%-54.6%). Conclusions and Relevance: This cross-sectional study found that dermatology encounters with racial minority groups, women, and younger patients generated fewer wRVUs than encounters with older White male patients. This finding suggests that physician compensation based on wRVUs may encourage the provision of services that exacerbate disparities in access to dermatologic care.

Commentary: Global Comparisons of Physician Associations.

The authors reflect on their own work in relation to the articles in this special section on physician organizations, and they make four observations. First, association-government power relations shift after countries introduce universal health insurance, but they are by no means diminished. In France, Germany, and Japan, physicians' economic interests are explicitly considered against broader health system goals, such as providing affordable universal insurance. In low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), physician organizations do not share power in the same way. Second, in higher-income countries, fragmentation may occur along specialty or generalist lines, and some physicians are unionized. Generally speaking, physician influence over reimbursement policy is reduced because of organizational fragmentation. Third, associations develop as legitimate voices for physicians, but their relationship to other professions differs in higher-income countries. Associations in LMICs form coalitions with other health professionals. Finally, although German state physician associations have a key implementation role, in most countries, state and federal policy roles seem relatively defined. Global comparison of the LMICs and other countries suggests power, unity, legitimacy, and federal roles are tied closely to the stage of health system development.

Getting The Price Right: How Some Countries Control Spending In A Fee-For-Service System.

Although the US has the highest health care prices in the world, the specific mechanisms commonly used by other countries to set and update prices are often overlooked, with a tendency to favor strategies such as reducing the use of fee-for-service reimbursement. Comparing policies in three high-income countries (France, Germany, and Japan), we describe how payers and physicians engage in structured fee negotiations and standardize prices in systems where fee-for-service is the main model of outpatient physician reimbursement. The parties involved, the frequency of fee schedule updates, and the scope of the negotiations vary, but all three countries attempt to balance the interests of payers with those of physician associations. Instead of looking for policy importation, this analysis demonstrates the benefits of structuring negotiations and standardizing fee-for-service payments independent of any specific reform proposal, such as single-payer reform and public insurance buy-ins.

Fee-for-service payment is not the (main) problem.

OBJECTIVE: To understand the effect of physician payment incentives on the allocation of health care resources. DATA SOURCES/STUDY SETTING: Review and analysis of the literature on physician payment incentives. STUDY DESIGN: Analysis of current physician payment incentives and several ways to modify those incentives to encourage increased efficiency. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Fee-for-service payments can be incorporated into systems that encourage efficient pricing - prices that are close to the provider's marginal cost - by giving consumers information on provider-specific prices and a strong incentive to choose lower cost providers. However, efficient pricing of services ultimately will need to be supplemented by incentives for efficient production of health and functional status. CONCLUSIONS: The problem with current FFS payment is not paying a fee for each service, per se, but the way in which the fees are determined.

Billing Codes Determine Lower Physician Income for Primary Care and Non-Procedural Specialties.

The income gap between specialists and primary care physicians and among specialists is well established, but the drivers of this difference are not well delineated. Using the Community Tracking Study (CTS) Physician Survey, we sought to isolate and compare premiums paid to physicians for specialization and the proportion of time spent on offices visit rather than procedures. We divided medical subspecialties according the proportion of Medicare billing for Evaluation and Management (E&M) codes for the specialty as a whole. We report substantial differences in income across physician specialty, and over 70 percent of the difference in income remained controlling for factors that may confound the relationship between income and specialty including gender, location and type of practice, and hours. We note a large variation in premiums for specialization: 11.3-46.8 percent above family medicine after controlling for confounders. Classifying medical subspecialties by E&M billing as procedural versus non-procedural specialties revealed clear income differences. Controlling for confounders, procedural medical specialties earned 37.5 percent more than family medicine, as compared with 15.3 percent for non-procedural medical specialties. This analysis suggests that differences in physician income and resulting incentives are a direct consequence of the payment structure itself, rather than compensation for additional years of training or a reflection of different underlying demographics.

Removing restrictions on nurse practitioners' scope of practice in New York State: Physicians' and nurse practitioners' perspectives.

BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE: In 2015, New York State adopted the Nurse Practitioners Modernization Act to remove required written practice agreements between physicians and nurse practitioners (NPs) with at least 3,600 hours of practice experience. We assessed the perspectives of physicians and NPs on the barriers and facilitators of policy implementation. METHODS: Qualitative descriptive design and individual face-to-face interviews were used to collect data from physicians and NPs. One researcher conducted interviews, which were audio-taped and transcribed. Twenty-six participants were interviewed. Two researchers analyzed the data. RESULTS: The new law has not yet changed NP practice. Almost all experienced NPs had written practice agreements. Outdated organizational bylaws, administrators' and physicians' lack of awareness of NP competencies, and physician resistance and lack of knowledge of the law were barriers. Collegial relationships between NPs and physicians and positive perceptions of the law facilitated policy implementation. CONCLUSIONS: Policy makers and administrators should make efforts to remove barriers and promote facilitators to assure the law achieves its maximum impact. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICES: Efforts should be undertaken to implement the law in each organization by engaging leadership, increasing awareness about the positive impact of the law and NP independence, and promoting relationships between NPs and physicians.

No Permanent Fix: MACRA, MIPS, and the Politics of Physician Payment Reform.

Organized medicine long yearned for the demise of Medicare's Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) formula for updating physician fees. Congress finally obliged in 2015, repealing the SGR as part of the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA). MACRA established value-based metrics for physician payment and financial incentives for doctors to join alternative delivery models like patient-centered medical homes. Throughout the law's initial implementation, the politics of accommodation prevailed, with federal officials crafting final rules that made MACRA more favorable for physicians. However, the era of accommodation could be short-lived. The discretion that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services had during the first two years of implementation is ending. Additionally, euphoria over the SGR's repeal has given way to concerns over the new program's value-based purchasing arrangements and uncertainty over their sustainability. MACRA eliminated the SGR, but not the politics of physician payment.

Leap of Faith--Medicare's New Physician Payment System.

Medicare's new payment system reflects the movement toward value-based payment, which is built on the view that we can contain costs only by eliminating fee-for-service payment. But there are important problems with this belief and the reforms it inspires.

Learning from New York City : a case study of public health policy practice in the Bloomberg administration.

OBJECTIVES: To ascertain any lessons learned about how public health reforms undertaken in New York City during the Bloomberg Administration were shepherded through the public policy and administration gauntlet. The question is, how feasible is this approach and would it work outside of New York City? DESIGN/SETTING/PARTICIPANTS: Using a theoretically grounded case study approach, 3 initiatives were examined that were proposed and/or implemented during a 10-year period of the Mayoralty of Michael Bloomberg (2002-2011): transfats restrictions, clean bus transportation policies, and a sugar-sweetened beverages tax (as a counterfactual). The investigation began by performing a comprehensive public documents search and was followed with interviews of 27 individuals involved in the selected policy initiatives. Interviews were coded in Nvivo using an iterative, grounded methodology. RESULTS: Using a theoretical lens, the case study illustrates that the multifaceted role of leadership was not confined to the executives in the City or the Agency. Instead, leadership extended to other administrative officials within the agency and the Board of Health. Second, New York City used reorganization and coordinative mechanisms strategically to ensure achievement of their goals. This included creation of new departments/bureaus and coordinating structures across the City. Evidence of the explicit use of incentives, as initially anticipated from the theoretical framework, was not found. CONCLUSIONS: While some aspects of this case study are unique to the context of New York City, 2 approaches used in New York City are feasible for other jurisdictions: harnessing the full scope and breadth of authority of the agency and its associated boards and commissions, and remobilizing existing workforce to explicitly focus on and coordinate targeted policies for issues of concern. Questions for further consideration are posed at the conclusion of the article.

The resource-based relative value scale and physician reimbursement policy.

Most physicians are unfamiliar with the details of the Resource-Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS) and how changes in the RBRVS influence Medicare and private reimbursement rates. Physicians in a wide variety of settings may benefit from understanding the RBRVS, including physicians who are employees, because many organizations use relative value units as productivity measures. Despite the complexity of the RBRVS, its logic and ideal are simple: In theory, the resource usage (comprising physician work, practice expense, and liability insurance premium costs) for one service is relative to the resource usage of all others. Ensuring relativity when new services are introduced or existing services are changed is, therefore, critical. Since the inception of the RBRVS, the American Medical Association's Relative Value Scale Update Committee (RUC) has made recommendations to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services on changes to relative value units. The RUC's core focus is to develop estimates of physician work, but work estimates also partly determine practice expense payments. Critics have attributed various health-care system problems, including declining and growing gaps between primary care and specialist incomes, to the RUC's role in the RBRVS update process. There are persistent concerns regarding the quality of data used in the process and the potential for services to be overvalued. The Affordable Care Act addresses some of these concerns by increasing payments to primary care physicians, requiring reevaluation of the data underlying work relative value units, and reviewing misvalued codes.

Early policy responses to the human papillomavirus vaccine in the United States, 2006-2010.

PURPOSE: To examine the policies state governments pursued and enacted across the United States in the 5-year period after the U.S. Food and Drug Administration licensed the human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine in 2006, including the timing and number of bills introduced, the policies proposed, and the legislative success of HPV vaccine policy proposals. METHODS: Content abstraction and analysis of state-level HPV vaccine-related bills across the 50 states and the District of Columbia introduced between 2006 and 2010. RESULTS: All but five states (Alaska, Delaware, Idaho, New Hampshire, and Wyoming) introduced HPV vaccine bills between 2006 and 2010. Two-thirds of all bills were introduced in 2007. In all, 141 bills were introduced and 23% or 32 bills were enacted. Of the bills that were enacted, 43.8% provided information for parents and schools about the vaccine; 37.5% provided public financing for HPV vaccines; 34.4% were classified as other policies; 25% created awareness campaigns; 25% required private insurance coverage of the HPV vaccination; 12.5% included voluntary vaccination, and 9.4% mandated vaccination for school entry. One bill reversed prior mandatory vaccination policies. Overall, 91% of enacted HPV vaccine bills did not refer to mandated vaccinations but adopted alternate policy strategies in response to the availability of the new HPV vaccine. CONCLUSIONS: Nationwide, states responded to the new HPV vaccine by introducing policies designed to increase the availability of information about the vaccine, provide funding, and regulate private insurance coverage rather than require vaccination for school entry.

Integration: the firm and the health care sector.

Integration in health care is a key goal of health reform in United States and England. Yet past efforts in the 1990s to better integrate the delivery system were of limited success. Building on work by Bevan and Janus on delivery integration, this article explores integration through the lens of economic theories of integration. Firms generally integrate to increase efficiency through economies of scale, to improve their market power, and resolve the transaction costs involved with multiple external suppliers. Using the United States and England as laboratories, we apply concepts of economic integration to understand why integration does or does not occur in health care, and whether expectations of integrating different kinds of providers (hospital, primary care) and health and social services are realistic. Current enthusiasm for a more integrated health care system expands the scope of integration to include social services in England, but retains the focus on health care in the United States. We find mixed applicability of economic theories of integration. Economies of scale have not played a significant role in stimulating integration in both countries. Managerial incentives for monopoly or oligopoly may be more compelling in the United States, since hospitals seek higher prices and more leverage over payers. In both countries the concept of transaction costs could explain the success of new payment and budgeting methods, since health care integration ultimately requires resolving transaction costs across different delivery organizations.

Residential segregation and the survival of U.S. urban public hospitals.

Residential segregation is associated geographic disparities in access to care, but its impact on local health care policy, including public hospitals, is unknown. We examined the effects of racial residential segregation on U.S. urban public hospital closures from 1987 to 2007, controlling for hospital, market, and policy characteristics. We found that a high level of residential segregation moderated the protective effects of Black population composition, such that a high level of residential segregation, in combination with a high percentage of poor residents, conferred a higher likelihood of hospital closure. More segregated and poorer communities face disadvantages in access to care that may be compounded as a result of instability in the health care safety net. Policy makers should consider the influence of social factors such as residential segregation on the allocation of the safety net resources.

Income eligibility thresholds, premium contributions, and children's coverage outcomes: a study of CHIP expansions.

OBJECTIVE: To understand the effects of Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) income eligibility thresholds and premium contribution requirements on health insurance coverage outcomes among children. DATA SOURCES: 2002-2009 Annual Social and Economic Supplements of the Current Population Survey linked to data from multiple secondary data sources. STUDY DESIGN: We use a selection correction model to simultaneously estimate program eligibility and coverage outcomes conditional upon eligibility. We simulate the effects of three premium schedules representing a range of generosity levels and the effects of income eligibility thresholds ranging from 200 to 400 percent of the federal poverty line. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Premium contribution requirements decrease enrollment in public coverage and increase enrollment in private coverage, with larger effects for greater contribution levels. Our simulation results suggest minimal changes in coverage outcomes from eligibility expansions to higher income families under premium schedules that require more than a modest contribution (medium or high schedules). CONCLUSIONS: Our simulation results are useful counterpoints to previous research that has estimated the average effect of program expansions as they were implemented without disentangling the effects of premiums or other program features. The sensitivity to premiums observed suggests that although contribution requirements may be effective in reducing crowd-out, they also have the potential, depending on the level of contribution required, to nullify the effects of CHIP expansions entirely. The persistence of uninsurance among children under the range of simulated scenarios points to the importance of Affordable Care Act provisions designed to make the process of obtaining coverage transparent and navigable.